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American cousins could not vote when they reached their age of majority, were
proud Canadians. Muriel Kitagawa, a Canadian Nisei, recalled clinging to Walter
Scotts lines, This is my own, my native land when, as an adult, she endured the
wartime uprooting. On both sides of the border, schools promoted tolerance and
good citizenship. That did not save people of Japanese ancestry from wartime dislo-
cation, but the lessons taught may have contributed to the waning of discrimination
after the war.
Patricia E. Roy
University of Victoria
Bertrand M. Patenaude  The Big Show in Bololand: The American Relief Expedi-
tion to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921. Stanford, California: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2002. Pp. xiv, 818.
This spacious and engaging work provides far and away the best account yet written
of the American Relief Administration and its work in combatting the Russian fam-
ine of 19211922. Drawing upon the letters, diaries, and reminiscences of American
and Russian participants, as well as the official archives of the ARA, Bertrand M.
Patenaude has produced a richly layered portrait of this extraordinary humanitarian
effort. Equally praiseworthy is his dispassionate discussion of the clash of cultures
and the political disputes that the relief expedition inevitably produced. The book is
an unabashed paean to the nearly 300 American field workers who carried the
ARAs work into Russia, but it takes full measure of their individual faults as well as
the brashness and insensitivity that marked them collectively.
A word has to be said about the unfortunate title. Patenaude strives throughout to
communicate the peculiar ethos of the relief effort, a mix of genuine idealism and
business enterprise, college high-jinx, and lost-generation angst. The letters and con-
versations of the relievers (as they were referred to officially) are peppered with con-
temporary slang and organizational jargon. A Big Show was something of real
significance (the 19141918 war had been a Big Show). Bolos was a term widely
employed across Eastern Europe in that era to refer to Bolsheviks. Bololand was a
purely ARA construct denoting, of course, Soviet Russia. The Big Show in
Bololand, then, was the insiders name for the largest and most important of Herbert
Hoovers relief efforts.
In 1921 Hoovers political career and disastrous presidency lay years in the
future. He was known as a successful engineer and millionaire businessman and
acclaimed as the worlds most effective humanitarian. The American Relief Admin-
istration was the last of a series of famine relief programmes that Hoover had cre-
ated, going back to the first years of the war. Prior to August 1921 the ARAs
activity had been centred in the post-Versailles nations of Eastern Europe, where a
successful formula had been developed in which small cadres of American adminis-
trators mobilized committees of local citizens to distribute foodstuffs. Efficiency,
sound business practices, and the autonomy of the reliever on the spot were stressed.
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This was the template that the ARA sought to employ to combat famine in Russia.
In the event, it had to be considerably modified because of the peculiar nature of
Soviet society and the suspicions of the Russian government.
The activities of the ARA in Russia were regulated by the Riga Agreement of
August 1921 signed by representatives of the ARA and Maxim Litvinov, Assistant
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR. There was a great deal of anxiety in the
Soviet government over the risks entailed in admitting so large an American pres-
ence to Russia; balancing these fears was the hope that a successful collaboration
with Hoovers organization might pave the way for the resumption of broader eco-
nomic ties with the West, a goal of Lenins recently announced New Economic Pol-
icy (NEP). In the end, however, the ever-worsening famine and the prospects of
mass starvation made the collaboration necessary. The Riga Agreement shows how
strong a hand the ARA had in the negotiations. It won virtual immunity from Rus-
sian law for its American staff and a free hand on the vital questions of how the food
would be distributed and who would receive it. These were bitter pills for the Soviet
government to swallow and, while generally honouring the Riga Agreement, it tire-
lessly sought to exert greater control over the ARA, its operations, and its employ-
ees. This impulse to control and the ARAs equally stubborn insistence on autonomy
remained a constant counterpoint to the common task of averting a human catastro-
phe. Turf wars comprise a great part of the official record of the ARA in Russia, and
Patenaude deals with them in detail. While he clearly favours the ARA position on
most points, his recounting remains evenhanded and generous, a contrast to the ran-
corous tone of earlier accounts.
The symbol of Soviet interference was Aleksandr Eiduk, a fearsome former secret
policeman, who was installed next to ARA headquarters in Moscow with the title of
Representative Plenipotentiary. He was constantly embroiled in disputes with Will-
iam N. Haskell, ARA director for Russia, and he tried to establish a network of local
plenipotentiaries in the various district headquarters across the country. This harass-
ment finally forced Haskell to employ the ARAs trump card, a credible threat to end
the food shipments. Eidok was reprimanded by the Soviet government and shortly
afterward was replaced. In Patenaudes view, by far the greater part of government
obstructionism was generated on the district level by meddlesome or incompetent
local officials.
One of Patenaudes stated aims is to take his account beyond the narrative record
and to give a human dimension to the ARAs experience in Russia. A great part of
the book is taken up with a recounting of the impressions and experiences of the
relievers and their reception by Russian society. Two full chapters are devoted to
relations with Russian women, which range from marriages destined to last a life-
time to the employment of prostitutes at drunken parties and even to accusations of
bartering food for sexual services. The struggle with obtuse officialdom is a frequent
theme, but we also learn of armed confrontations with bandits and panicked flight
from wolves. Patenaudes scholarship has in many instances unearthed more than
one variant of these events, and the reader gets the bonus of several good yarns spun
about each adventure.
Typhus raged throughout the famine regions during the missions stay, but there
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was only one fatality among the relievers. The greatest health threats to the Ameri-
cans were alcoholism and nervous breakdown. Many of the ARA men were known
as drinkers before they came to Russia, and the stress of the work combined with the
easy availability of alcohol (prohibition was in force in the United States, but the
Riga Agreement guaranteed the unlimited importation of commissary supplies)
led to heavy habitual drinking and the occasional epic bender. Two senior members
of the Moscow staff were sent home for drinking. Stress, as well, was a contributing
factor to famine shock, nervous collapse as a result of confronting one too many
scenes of hunger and death. Enough of these images are included among the photo-
graphs in this book to suggest what effect must have been produced in the minds of
those who lived in the midst of famine for up to two years. The businesslike and
emotionally distant approach the relievers affected towards their work, an attitude
that frequently shocked their Russian employees, was as much an attempt to insulate
themselves from the surrounding horrors as it was an affirmation of the Hooverite
principles of efficiency and practicality.
By the summer of 1922, it was evident that the harvest of that year would be abun-
dant. As well, the agrarian programme of the NEP was already having an effect in
stimulating greater grain production. Hoover, therefore, resolved to shut down the
relief expedition, and within a year the last ARA man was out of Russia. Successive
Soviet governments ignored or played down the contributions of the ARA, and
Haskell, on a trip to Russia a decade later, noted that the effort which fed nearly
eleven million Russians in the days of the darkest famine of 1921 and 1922, seems
almost forgotten (p. 725). Its memory was kept alive in America chiefly through the
efforts of the ex-relievers. In 1925 the ARA Association was founded, and its periodic
meetings lasted into the 1960s. The A.R.A. Association Review, established in the
same year, published 39 issues over 40 years. A host of letters, reminiscences, and
photographs were collected and catalogued, creating the archival base that Patenaude
has so skilfully employed in bringing to life this extraordinary episode in American-
Russian relations.
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La synthèse de Guy Saupin est la cinquième à porter sur lensemble de lhistoire des
villes françaises à lépoque moderne, après celles dAlbert Babeau (1880; LHar-
mattan, 1997), dEmmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, directeur du tome 3 de lHistoire de la
France urbaine (Seuil, 1981), de Jean Meyer (SEDES, 19831984) et de Benoît
Garnot (Ophrys, 1989). Louvrage sinscrit dans lexcellente collection « Belin Sup
Histoire » qui compte plus de quinze titres pour la seule période 15001800.
Ce manuel universitaire aux paramètres dédition parfaitement pédagogiques,
avec un fort appareil de cartes, tableaux, graphiques, photographies, documents,
